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I. Introduction
Buying a home is an important event in a person's
life, and researching a new home can be a tremendous
task. The Illinois legislature recognized the stress of this
process and the potential problems that may confront
prospective buyers. In response, the State legislature
enacted the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act ("Consumer Fraud Act"), the Residential
Real Property Disclosure Act ("Disclosure Act"), and the
Real Estate Brokers and Salesman License Act ("Brokers
Act") to protect buyers from misrepresentations and
non-disclosures made by selling homeowners and real
estate brokers.
These three Acts extend statutory protection
beyond common law fraudulent misrepresentation,
compelling brokers and selling homeowners to use
integrity in the sale of homes. In addition to actual dam-
ages, some of these acts provide for attorney's fees and
court costs as an additional deterrent for misrepresenta-
tions and non-disclosures in home sales.
This Note will explore the disclosures that must
be made when selling a home. To begin, this Note will
describe the general duties of homeowners and brokers
to potential buyers. Also relevant are the main causes of
action used by buyers in misrepresentation and non-
disclosure suits against both selling homeowners and
real estate brokers, and the damages associated with
such actions.
Part III analyzes relevant case law and the impact
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such decisions has had on homeowners. Part IV will
discuss the future of residential real estate disclosure
laws.
II. Background
A. Causes of Action in Misrepresentation and Non-
Disclosure Suits
1. Homeowners
The main causes of action that a buyer has against
the selling homeowner fall under common law fraudu-
lent misrepresentation and the Residential Real Property
Disclosure Act.'
The traditional view of fraud with respect to sellers
was very much caveat emptor.2 Sellers were not required
to, and therefore were not liable for failing to disclose
latent, pre-existing defects.3 However, the modem trend
of real estate law has moved away from caveat emptor,
and now a duty is imposed on sellers to disclose defects
that could not have been discovered by the buyer through
a reasonable and diligent inspection of the premises.4 The
policy behind the modem view is that "a prospective
home buyer may not shut his eyes to the obvious and
then charge that he has been deceived, particularly where
there was ample opportunity to further investigate."5
When pleading fraudulent misrepresentation, the buyer
must allege, with specificity, the facts from which the
fraud may be found, including what representations were
made, when they were made, who made such misrepre-
sentations, and to whom they were made.6
The elements which must be proved for common
law fraud are: 1) a false statement of material fact; 2) the
false statement was intentionally made; 3) the party to
whom the statement was made had a right to rely on it;
4) the statement was made for the purpose of inducing
reliance; and 5) reliance led to the injury.7 A "material
Loyola Consumer Law ReviewVolume 12, Number 4 2000
fact" is a fact that, if known, would have changed the
way the party acted.8 However, silence by the seller
alone is not enough to constitute concealment of a mate-
rial fact; deceptive conduct is needed for active conceal-
ment and fraud. 9 With misrepresentation, the party
claiming fraud (usually the buyer) is required to prove
the element by a clear and convincing standard; proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is not required) 0
In Mitchell v. Skubiak, the plaintiff buyers noticed
cracks in the ceiling." The defendant homeowner ex-
plained that the cracks were due to humidity variances,
when in reality, he knew that the cracks were due to
faulty roof repair.12 The Mitchell court noted that the
defendant actively misled the plaintiff by telling him that
the defect was due to something other than its actual
cause. 3 The court also stated that there were no other
marks in the area to lead the plaintiff to believe that
something other than humidity had caused the
problem. 4 Because the plaintiff inquired as to the cracks
in the roof, the defendant seller had a duty to speak, and
the court found the defendant liable for fraudulent mis-
representation.15
But the court only goes so far with respect to
finding sellers liable for fraudulent misrepresentation. In
the same case, the defendant seller told the plaintiff that
water had to be swept off of the garage roof.16 The plain-
tiff then sued the homeowner for misrepresentation
when later water leaked into the garage. 7 The court
found that the homeowner's statement was a not
misrepresentation. The court held that the seller fully
disclosed this problem, and that it is a common-sense
notion that if water is not swept off of a roof, it will
leak.19
A second cause of action by buyers against selling
homeowners for non-disclosure is under the Residential
Real Property Disclosure Act.20 The Act requires sellers
of residential real estate to provide potential buyers with
Loyola Consumer Law Review Volume 12, Number 4 2000
a written disclosure report, disclosing defects and other
conditions of the property.2 The Act also provides that a
seller is not liable for any inaccuracy, omission or error in
the report if: 1) he had no knowledge of such error, inac-
curacy or omission; 2) he had a reasonable belief that
such error, inaccuracy or omission was correct; or 3) the
error, inaccuracy or omission was based on information
provided by a public agency or licensed professional, and
the seller had no knowledge of such error, inaccuracy or
omission.22 A homeowner that knowingly violates this
Act and fails to truthfully complete the disclosure report
shall be liable for damages. 23
In Woods v. Pence the buyers brought an action
under the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act.24 In
Woods, the plaintiff buyers noticed water marks on the
ceiling of the defendant homeowner's house, but nothing
was mentioned on the disclosure report with respect to a
leaky roof.25 When the plaintiffs inquired about the
marks, the defendants said that it was nothing.26 Later, it
was discovered that the defendants had the roof patched
three times, and were told that the roof would soon have
to be replaced.27
As mentioned before, the Disclosure Act requires
the seller to complete the disclosure form "containing
various statements about the condition of the prop-
erty."28 In order for the seller to be liable for non-disclo-
sure, scienter or intent to deceive, must be proved.29
Additionally, the seller need not conceal the defect in
order to be found liable under this Act.30 In Woods, the
court held that the sellers may have known of the defec-
tive condition of the roof based on evidence that it had
been patched three times.3 1 Even though the plaintiffs
noticed the water marks, they were entitled to rely on the
truthfulness of the sellers' disclosure.32 Issues of fact
existed as to whether the defendants knowingly made
the false statement concerning the roof, and the case was
remanded .?
In adition, a seller is not relieved of his duty to
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disclose defects when the buyer hires an inspector to
investigate the premises. 34 In Mitchell, the plaintiff had a
cause of action for misrepresentation against both the
seller and the inspector for failing to disclose numerous
defects in the house.3 5 The Mitchell court noted that
purchasers cannot hire an inspector and subrogate their
common law duty to inspect the premises and then later
claim they had no knowledge of the defect, which could
have been discovered with reasonable diligence. 36 Also, a
buyer's claim against the inspector, does not exonerate
the seller who made the misrepresentation; the buyer can
rely on both the seller's and a third party's representa-
tions about the premises. 7
2. Real Estate Brokers
As real estate brokers are in a position of trust
with respect to the purchasers with whom they are nego-
tiating, actions can arise from violations of the Real Estate
Brokers and Salesman License Act and the Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act. Real estate brokers
have a duty to use due care in obtaining and communi-
cating information upon which a potential buyer may
rely.38 Brokers also have a duty, as do homeowners, to
disclose material facts to prospective buyers, and con-
cealment of these facts constitutes fraud.3 9
In Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., the
plaintiff buyers brought an action against the defendant
brokers for violating the Brokers Act?4 Even absent the
existence of an agency relationship, brokers occupy a
position of trust with respect to the potential buyers with
whom they are negotiating and owe these buyers a duty
to exercise good faith.41 Here, the court held that the
brokers had a duty to disclose the actual size of the lot.42
Concealment of these facts constituted fraud.43 The
broker argued, with respect to the size of the lot, that the
buyers were given a copy of the property survey, and
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because of this there was no issue of non-disclosure with
respect to the size of the lot.44 The court denied this
argument on grounds that, in addition to the survey not
providing square footage, a typical buyer would be
unable to read and understand such a survey, and this
constituted concealment of a material fact.45
The Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act is designed to protect consumers from
fraudulent and unfair methods of competition and de-
ceptive acts or practices used in the conduct of any trade
or business. 46 This Act has been applied to misrepresen-
tations made by real estate brokers to potential buyers.47
The Act imputes liability upon the broker only if he
knows of the false or misleading character of the infor-
mation that is communicated to the potential buyer but is
not intended to make a broker liable for latent defects.Y
Additionally, to avoid placing an undue burden on
brokers, a broker is not liable for latent defects left undis-
closed by the seller prior to sale.49 The potential buyer
does not have to show either reliance or diligence in
discovering such misstatements either.50
Harkala v. Wildwood Realty, Inc. illustrates the
limitations of the Consumer Fraud Act in placing liability
upon a broker. In Harkala, the buyers noticed a termite
problem after the purchase of their home, and sued the
broker for misrepresentation under the Consumer Fraud
Act.5 The buyers never inquired as to termite infestation
or the structure of the house, and did not make use of
their right to inspect the premises.52 The court held that
because the buyers never inquired as to these problems,
and since this was not disclosed to the broker by the
seller prior to the sale, the broker was not liable under
the Act.53
B. Damages For Breach
There are a few different ways of determining the
amount of damages that a potential buyer may recover
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for misrepresentations made by seller/homeowner or a
real estate broker. Under the common law tort of fraudu-
lent misrepresentation, plaintiff buyers can recover
purely economic losses in tort against those who are in
the business of supplying information for the guidance of
others in business transactions. 54 Real estate brokers are
in the business of supplying such information, and there-
fore a buyer can recover purely economic damages from
a broker.5 Damages for economic loss may be recovered
from a homeowner only where the tort action is for
intentional misrepresentation.56 Therefore, in a cause of
action for intentional fraud, an injured buyer may also
recover damages for solely economic loss from a home-
owner.
5 7
In other cases, a purchaser who has established
fraud is entitled to damages which will give him the
benefit of the bargain. One method of returning to the
buyer the benefit of the bargain is to calculate the differ-
ence between the value of the property at the time of sale
in absence of the defect, and the value of the property at
the time of sale in the condition in which it was sold.59
In situations where a homeowner knowingly
violated or failed to perform a duty required by the
Disclosure Act, the homeowner shall be liable for actual
damages.6° Often, the court will also impose court costs
and attorney's fees.61 In these situations, a buyer's
knowledge of potential defects is relevant in the amount
of damages that may be recovered.62
III. Further Impact of Non-Disclosure Laws on
Homeowners and Real Estate Brokers
The non-disclosure laws place a large responsibil-
ity upon both selling homeowners and real estate brokers
to divulge any and all information regarding a home.
Though actions are available against both selling
homeowners and brokers, some added protection is
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given to brokers when their associated seller has not
made a full disclosure to them. In Munjal v. Baird &
Warner, Inc., a real estate broker was protected from
liability due to non-disclosure by the selling homeowner.
In Munjal, the plaintiff buyers had a contract to
buy a house from the defendant homeowner.63 During
an inspection, the plaintiffs noticed pools of water in the
basements, and the sump pump was running continu-
ously.64 The plaintiffs were told by the broker that the
pooling was temporary and was caused by a leaky valve
in the sump pump.65 Once the valve was fixed, the water
stopped pooling.' Just prior to their moving in, the
plaintiffs went through the house again and saw that
water was leaking in another spot in the basement and
decided that they did not want to purchase the house.67
The broker agreed that there was a problem and sug-
gested that the plaintiffs see their attorney.68 The plain-
tiffs hired their own expert, who testified that the water
leaks were due to the foundation of the house being
constructed lower than groundwater level. He also testi-
fied that such a defect would not be visible to the naked
eye. 69
The court noted that the homeowner was involved
in the construction of the house, and had lived there for
two and a half years prior to this sale.7' There was also
evidence that there were traces of water damage when
the house was initially put up for sale.71 The court found
the continuous running of the sump pump circumstantial
evidence to show that the homeowner had an opportu-
nity to notice the chronic water problem in the base-
ment.72 Based on these facts, the court held the home-
owner liable for misrepresentation because his failure to
disclose the full extent of the water problem was an
attempt to deceive the plaintiffs in order to induce them
to purchase the house.73 The intent behind this failure to
disclose, the court noted, was proven by the circumstan-
tial evidence of the sump pump running continuously.74
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On the other hand, the court found no liability as
to the real estate broker.75 Although there is no agency
relationship between the broker and the plaintiffs, the
broker did have a duty to use good faith in his negotia-
tions with the plaintiffs. 76 But the court found no evi-
dence in this case that the broker intentionally misrepre-
sented that the house did not have a water problem.77
The original water leak stopped when the sump pump
valve was repaired. 7 The broker did not conceal the
defect, and agreed that there was a problem and told the
plaintiffs to talk to their attorney.79 The court stated that
the broker's actions were "reasonable in light of the
circumstances and absolved him from any question of
deception or concealment in inducing plaintiffs to pur-
chase." 80 The court also noted that the plaintiffs did not
rely on the broker's statements. 81 The broker was not
liable for the hidden defects of which he had no prior
knowledge, and the selling homeowners were liable for
damages.82 The amount of damages was the difference
between the value of the house at the time of sale includ-
ing the water problems, and the value of the house at the
time of sale without such problems. 3
IV. Impact
The court's reasoning in Munjal and in similar
cases is sound; it places a burden on both the homeowner
and broker to disclose statements about the property, but
does not place an undue and unfair burden on the broker
to be responsible for the fraud of the homeowner. How-
ever, the courts should consider applying the Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act to
homeowners. Currently, this Act only applies to brokers
when misrepresentations are made to potential buyers.
The Consumer Fraud Act applies when any unfair
methods of competition or deceptive sales practices are
employed in the conduct of any trade or commerce.8
The rationale behind excluding homeowners from this
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Act is that an individual selling a home is not engaged in
trade or commerce. Currently, it is thought that the "ca-
sual' sale of a home by an individual is outside of the
scope of trade and commerce. However, section 1(f)
defines trade and commerce as "advertising, offering for
sale, sale, or distribution of any...thing of value...directly
or indirectly affecting the people of this State."8 5 From
this definition of trade or commerce, an individual sell-
ing his own house should be included within the scope of
the Act. The individual is offering for sale a thing of
value that directly or indirectly affects the people of this
State.
The courts have gone far in protecting a potential
buyer from the dangers of non-disclosure in applying
and enforcing the non-disclosure laws. By expanding the
scope of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act so it applies to individual homeowners, the
legislature could further protect the interests of consum-
ers when buying a house.
V. Conclusion
As the cases of Mitchell v. Skubiak, Harkala v. Wild-
wood Realty, Inc., and Munjal v. Baird & Warner, Inc. sug-
gest, the courts have given buyers considerable protec-
tion from the dangers of misrepresentation and non-
disclosure by both homeowners and real estate brokers.
Actions under the common law tort of fraudulent mis-
representation, the Real Estate Brokers License and Sales-
man Act, the Residential Real Property Disclosure Act
and the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Prac-
tices Act are common, and in many cases the holdings
are in favor of the injured buyers. The courts, however,
can go further in their protection of consumers by ex-
panding the scope of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act to include individuals selling a
home. Such an interpretation would offer more complete
protection to the consumers during the difficult process
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of purchasing a home.
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